






































Trade in Services and Human 
Development: A First Look at the 
Links 
Ben Shepherd and Gloria Pasadilla 
No. 268  
March 2011 




The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; 
the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change.  ADBI’s  working 
papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages 
readers to post their comments on the main page for each working  paper (given in the 




Shepherd, B., and G. Pasadilla. 2011. Trade in Services and Human Development: A First 
Look at the Links. ADBI Working Paper 268. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
Available: http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2011/03/10/4485.trade.services.human.dev/ 
 












Ben Shepherd is the principal of Developing Trade Consultants Ltd. Gloria Pasadilla is a 
research fellow at the Asian Development Bank Institute. For helpful discussions, the 
authors are grateful to Bernard Hoekman, Mia Mikic, Deunden Nikomborirak, and 
participants at the ADBI-ARTNeT conference on Regulatory Reforms and Liberalization 
in Services: Examining Impacts on Inclusive and Sustainable Development, held in Bali, 
Indonesia on 11–12 October 2010. 
The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views or policies of ADBI, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of 
Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of 
the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of 
their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms. 
Asian Development Bank Institute 
Kasumigaseki Building 8F 
3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku  
Tokyo 100-6008, Japan 
 
Tel:   +81-3-3593-5500 
Fax:   +81-3-3593-5571 
URL:   www.adbi.org 
E-mail:   info@adbi.org 
 




Some services directly produce outputs that are important for human development, such as 
basic human services. Many other services are important inputs into the production and 
distribution of goods that are necessary for human development purposes. A more efficient 
services sector should mean that such goods and services can be made available to poor 
people more cost effectively and more broadly. In line with this reasoning, we find in the data 
that less restrictive services trade policies are associated with better human development 
outcomes across a range of sectors. Appropriate services trade liberalization can therefore 
promote human development directly through improved outcomes, in addition to indirectly 
effects through the income channel. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The services sector is becoming increasingly important in modern economies: In many of the 
most developed, it can represent two thirds or even three quarters of all economic activity. 
International trade in services is also increasing in importance, and has been growing more 
rapidly than goods trade over recent years (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2008). It has 
also proved more resilient to the global financial crisis and resulting trade collapse (Borchert 
and Mattoo, 2009). 
Existing work on services trade has largely concentrated  on two questions that do not 
directly relate to human development. The first is the determinants of international trade 
flows. Using methodologies such as the gravity model, researchers have investigated the 
range of factors that can promote or inhibit trade in services. In general, they have found that 
many of the factors known to impact goods trade—geographical distance, market size, and 
cultural or historical factors—also exert a strong influence on services trade (Kimura and 
Lee, 2006). 
The second strand of research on services trade has examined its implications for economic 
efficiency. These studies tend to have shown that a more restrictive services environment is 
associated with less efficient and lower-quality service provision, inefficient resource 
allocation, and slower economic growth (Arvis et al., 2010; Eschenbach and Hoekman, 
2006; and Findlay and Warren, 2000). Because services are often important inputs in the 
production of manufactured goods, an inefficient services sector can have economy-wide 
implications—including a loss of competitiveness for manufacturers and exporters (Arnold, 
Mattoo, and Narciso, 2008). 
It has long been recognized that services trade can influence economic and social outcomes 
through a variety of mechanisms. On the one hand, the economic gains from reform are 
significant (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (OECD), 2003; 
World Bank, 2002), and thus have the potential to promote human development by 
increasing per capita incomes.
1
                                                 
1 That per capita income is an important determinant of overall human development outcomes is reflected in the 
fact that the Human Development Index includes income as one of its components. 
 We refer to this linkage as the income channel. However, 
there has been considerable controversy as to possible incompatibilities between openness 
to services trade and the provision of human development-related services such as 
electricity, water, and telecommunications. More broadly, a tension has emerged in the 
human development literature between the economic case for liberalizing services markets, 
and a perceived social case for maintaining stricter regulations in order to promote human 
development objectives (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
2005; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2006). 
This paper will bring some of the first empirical evidence to bear on the direct links between 
services sector regulation and human development, going beyond the income channel. From 
an economic point of view, there are good reasons to believe that services liberalization 
might be positively—not negatively—associated with at least some human development 
outcomes. The reason is that more efficient provision of public and private services that are 
important for development can lead to lower prices for consumers, and more widespread 
availability of human development-related goods and services. For instance, Chile’s 
liberalization and privatization of its telecommunications sector, along with its use of “smart” 
subsidies, led to a strong increase in availability of telecommunications services, and thus an 
increase in the general population’s ability to access information and participate in political 
and social life (Wellenius, 2002). 
A second example of the links between openness to services trade and human development 
outcomes is the role that the distribution sector plays in reducing the cost of moving vital 
goods to the hinterland of poor countries (Sarley, Allain, and Akkihal, 2005). Examples 
include basic foodstuffs, medicines, and mosquito nets. Only with a relatively well-developed 
and efficient distribution sector is it possible to ensure that these types of products reach ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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those who need them at lowest possible private and public cost. For instance, (Sarley, Allain, 
and Akkihal, 2005) found that the logistics cost of moving bed nets from port to hinterland in 
Liberia amounts to nearly half the cost of the product. Reducing the logistics cost wedge 
clearly has great potential to help bring more bed nets to those who need them. 
In this paper, we examine the association between human development and services trade 
using simple nonparametric and parametric regression techniques. Our approach is to use 
an indicator of human development as the dependent variable, and (at least) per capita 
income and a measure of services sector policy restrictions as the independent variables. 
Our measures of policy restrictiveness vary at the sector level, so we run separate 
regressions using sector-specific measures of human development. Controlling for gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita means that we take account of the fact that it is an 
important determinant of human development, and that it tends to be strongly inversely 
correlated with service sector restrictiveness. We face formidable data constraints, however, 
and are generally unable to include a wide range of other control variables due to small 
sample size. The best we can do is to pool observations from three sectors, and use country 
and sector fixed effects to control for other influences. Our results should therefore be 
interpreted as providing a first indication of some important correlations in the data. In 
particular, they should be interpreted in terms of associations between variables rather than 
as evidence of causal links. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss our methodology and data in 
more detail. The section after that presents and discusses our results. We cover education, 
distribution, engineering, and telecommunications services, as well as pooled results across 
all sectors. The final section concludes with some policy implications and suggestions for 
further research. 
2.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Our objective in this paper is to provide some first evidence on the direct links between 
services trade policies and human development. By “direct”, we mean independent of 
income effects. For example, we expect that a less restrictive policy environment in the 
distribution sector should lead to more efficient and less costly service provision, and thus to 
wider availability of important human development products such as vaccines. More 
generally, we will test the following hypotheses using nonparametric and parametric 
regression techniques:
2
1.  Is openness to trade in education  services correlated with human development 
performance, as measured by indicators such as: the human development index, 
poverty rates, per capita income, and the democracy index? 
 
2.  Is openness to trade in distribution services correlated with human development 
performance in the form of higher immunization rates? 
3.  Is openness to trade in engineering services correlated with human development 
performance, as measured by indicators such as: road network density, and the 
availability of basic telecommunications services? 
4.  Is openness to trade in telecommunications  services correlated with human 
development performance, as measured by indicators such as: the HDI knowledge 
and education index, a political voice and accountability indicator, and the 
availability of basic telecommunications services? 
                                                 
2 Ideally, we would also like to include health services in the above list. However, data constraints mean that it is 
currently impossible to do so. The appendix, instead, discusses the human development dilemma involved in 
health services, and gives a somewhat more descriptive analysis of possible correlation of health services with 
human development outcomes such as equity and access. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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For each of these hypotheses, our dependent variable is a particular measure of human 
development performance. Most data are sourced from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the Human Development Report. For data on democracy and 
political voice and accountability, we use Freedom House and the World Governance 
Indicators respectively. As our main independent variable, we use sector-specific measures 
of policy restrictiveness sourced from the Australian Productivity Commission (APC).
3
3.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 These 
data are currently available for a single year only (2000), which we take as our base year for 
all empirical work. The database includes two main measures per sector, each of which is a 
numerical summary of a wide range of underlying policy information. The first (“domestic”) 
index represents the entry barriers and ongoing cost burdens to which domestic firms in a 
particular sector are subject. The second (“foreign”) index contains the same information in 
respect of foreign firms. The difference between the two represents the extent to which trade 
policy is discriminatory vis-à-vis overseas operators. 
Our methodology proceeds in two steps. First, we use a common nonparametric technique, 
the multivariate Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoother, to examine graphically the 
correlations among the variables of interest. The advantage of this method is that it allows us 
to analyze the relationship between the dependent and independent variables without 
imposing any particular functional form. It proceeds by running an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression separately for each data point, using a centered 80% sample of the 
original data as an estimating window. In the second step of our methodology, we run 
standard OLS regressions using the same independent and dependent variables to confirm 
the impressions given by the nonparametric regressions. 
3.1  Education Services 
Education services have an obvious link with human development. Liberal policies towards 
education can increase availability of education services and improve student access to 
them. Greater access boosts adult literacy and enrolment rates. As more people have 
access to education, this can also indirectly improve life expectancy, not only as a result of 
better knowledge of hygiene but also, possibly, because of greater life satisfaction and 
empowerment derived from being able to harness individual talents and capacities. 
Education also helps increase income.  As increased human capital leads to growth in 
productivity (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994), income growth follows. Education is also seen as 
a great ‘equalizer’ because it makes social and income mobility possible. Schooling also has 
an impact on the quality of public governance and democracy because it makes people 
more informed about society and enables them to better understand and assess potential 
risks and opportunities. Hence, education is an important foundation for democratic 
societies. 
We test the links between various human development outcomes and education services by 
regressing restrictions in education services
4
                                                 
3The Restrictions on Trade in Services Database is available online at 
 against various human development indicators. 
We use the Human Development Index (HDI), the education index of the HDI, per capita 
GDP, and a democracy index. Our hypothesis is that more open trade in education services 
will help improve the overall HDI and the HDI-education index (literacy and enrolment). 
Since education helps people find jobs and earn their living, it should also contribute to 
overall development and increase per capita income—an example of the income channel, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/ 
researchmemorandum/servicesrestriction 
4 We use restrictions on tertiary education services. The reason for this choice is that the collected restrictions on 
tertiary education across countries in the study by the Australian Productivity Commission are more 
comprehensive, while those for elementary and secondary education services are incomplete. The sample 
consists of 20 countries. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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discussed above. Finally, because education increases social and political awareness, it 
should help develop a more robust democracy. The converse of the above is that restrictions 
in services trade, therefore, restrict democracy, restrain income growth, and dampen the 
overall achievement of better human development. 
Unlike the other service sectors used in the rest of this paper, the APC study provides a 
breakdown of restrictions in education services trade by mode of supply. To take advantage 
of this wealth of information, we regress each of the modal restrictions on the different 
human development outcomes to understand which of the mode of supply restrictions 
exercise greater influence on human development. We also made a simple average of the 
different modal restriction indices to come up with a foreign restriction index,
5 which we also 
regress  against each of the other chosen dependent variables to make the results for 
education services comparable with those of other service sectors below. But unlike the rest 
of the paper, we do not examine the domestic restriction index’s effect on human 
development outcomes because data on domestic modal restrictions in the original APC 
study on education services are highly incomplete.
6 
The results show strong links between selected human development indicators and 
restrictions in education services. Significantly, of the four modes of supply, restrictions on 
commercial presence appear to have greater influence in affecting human development 
outcomes than restrictions in cross-border trade, consumption abroad, or  movements of 
natural persons. 
Nonparametric estimates using the HDI education index
7
                                                 
5 The limitation with taking the simple average of the modes of supply restrictions is that each of the modes is 
assumed to have equal weight or importance in the overall restrictions to trade in education services. 
Nonetheless, we try this simple method to be consistent with the rest of the paper, which uses overall foreign 
restriction indices. 
 show that foreign restrictions on 
commercial presence in education services have a more pronounced negative effect than 
restrictions on other modes of supply. Figure 1 shows that while restriction indices on 
consumption abroad, cross-border supply, and movement of natural persons have 
ambiguous relationships with education outcomes, the relationship in the case of commercial 
presence restrictions is clearly negative. Using the overall HDI index yields similar results as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
6 For details of the restriction index construction for education services, see Nguyen-Hong and Wells (2003). 
7 The HDI education index is comprised of literacy rates and school enrolment rates. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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Figure 1: Non-parametric Regressions of Human Development Index (HDI) Education 
Index Variable on Indices of Education Services Restrictiveness 
 
Data Source: UNDP (2005); Nguyen-Hong and Wells (2003). 
Table 1 corroborates the statistically strong negative correlation between foreign restrictions 
on commercial presence and the HDI.
8
                                                 
8 The HDI is comprised of both education and health indicators. Education indicators include enrolment and 
literacy rates, while health indicators include life expectancy and income. 
 Per capita GDP (in log form) strongly and positively 
correlates with the HDI indices, while restrictions on the commercial presence mode of 
supplying education services correlate negatively. The correlation is slightly weaker with the 
HDI than with the HDI education index, which is to be expected in light of the broader range 
of influences for which the former accounts. We also regress the simple average of the 
modal restrictions, the foreign restriction index, on the HDI and the HDI education index, but 
this yields no statistically significant results. This perhaps reflects the fact that the three other 
modes of supply—consumption abroad, cross-border, and movement of natural persons—




Table 1: Regressions on Human Development Indicators (HDI) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





Log (gross domestic 
product per capita) 
0.81***  0.087***  0.048***  0.056** 
  (0.01)  (0.012)  (0.15)  (0.022) 
Commercial 
Presence 
-0.012*    -0.024**   
  (0.01)    (0.011)   
Foreign Index 
(Combined) 
  -0.01    -0.027 
    (0.02)    (0.026) 
Constant  0.113  0.045  0.495***  0.402* 
  (0.088)  (0.13)  (0.149)  (0.228) 
Observations  19  19  19  19 
R
2  0.92  0.91  0.69  0.64 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Separate regressions using other modes of supply yielded no significant results. Statistical significance is indicated 
by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
Data Source: UNDP (2005) for human development index (HDI) and HDI education index; World Development 
Indicators (WDI) online database of the World Bank for GDP per capita; and Nguyen-Hong and Wells (2003) for 
foreign restrictiveness indices in higher education. 
We next tried other human development indicators like per capita income and a democracy 
index as dependent variables. Non-parametric estimates with the democracy index and log 
per capita GDP as dependent variables yield a different result from that of HDI indices. In 
these non-parametric regressions, all modes of supply restrictions show a significantly 
negative correlation with per capita income (Figure 2) and a positive correlation with the 
democracy index. The democracy index represents a worsening of democratic conditions as 
the index rises, hence the positive relationship with education services restrictions (Figure 
3). 
 ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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Data Source: UNDP (2005); World Bank (2002); Nguyen-Hong and Wells (2003). 
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Figure 3: Non-parametric Regressions of the Democracy Index on Indices of 




Data Source: UNDP (2005); World Bank (2002); Nguyen-Hong and Wells (2003). 
Table 2 validates the results from the non-parametric estimates.
9
                                                 
9 We are conscious that the per capita GDP regressions exclude a number of variables usually included in 
income and growth regressions. The reason is our very small sample size. These results should be taken as 
indicative only.  
 Least squares regression 
results show that all modes of supply restrictiveness indices have negative signs and strong 
statistical significance. Regressions with the democracy index as the dependent variable 
likewise yields a significantly positive correlation. The result shows that greater restriction on 
education services, in all modes of supply, is correlated with a worsening of democracy. 
We also tried regressing poverty rates, the Gini inequality index, and the cost of tertiary ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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education on the restriction indices. The poverty rates regressions yielded no statistically 
significant correlation with any of the restriction indices for education services. This is 
surprising as one would immediately associate greater provision and efficiency of education 
services with opening opportunities to a wider population and thus reducing poverty, but the 
result is not sufficiently conclusive. One reason might be that we are using restrictions in the 
tertiary education sector, due to unavailability of data for the more poverty-relevant primary 
and secondary sectors. Using the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable yielded 
significant results for restrictions in commercial presence, but with a positive sign. This 
means that, instead of education supplied via commercial presence reducing inequality, it 
instead worsens it. Again, this might be linked to our use of tertiary education data. The 
regression of cost of education,
10
Table 2: Regressions on Income and Democracy 
 however, yielded a significant negative correlation with 
restrictions on commercial presence. That is, education services that are open to foreign 
commercial presence are associated with a lower cost of education. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita  Democracy Index 
Population Growth   -0.768*** -0.382*  -0.756***  -0.723***  -0.534***           
  (0.16)  (0.206)  (0.155)  (0.208)  (0.174)           
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
          -0.244  -0.457  -0.368  -0.9056*  0.038 
            (0.34)  (0.48)  (0.35)  (0.42)  (0.39) 
Consumption 
Abroad 
-0.749***         1.4921***        






        0.5891*       
    (0.16)          (0.29)       
Cross-Border 
Supply 
    -1.22***          2.0013***    
      (0.26)          (0.41)     
Presence of Natural 
Persons 
      -0.846***          1.2669***  
        (0.16)          (0.41)   
Foreign Index 
(Combined) 
        -0.985***          2.0615*** 
          (0.21)          (0.42) 
Constant  10.75***  10.54*** 11.078***  10.77***  11.003***  3.441  5.874  4.402  10.1571** -0.145 
  (0.23)  (0.31)  (0.32)  (0.22)  (0.31)  (3.45)  (4.81)  (3.51)  (4.23)  (4) 
Observations  18  19  18  15  19  18  19  18  15  19 
R
2  0.65  0.54  0.6  0.46  0.67  0.64  0.44  0.59  0.65  0.67 
                                                 
10 The cost of education is represented by expenditure per student in tertiary education as a percentage of per 
capita GDP. Poverty rates are the percentage of the population living below $1.25/day. For the poverty 
equation, we used tobit regression due to the many zeros in the dependent variable representing developed 
country situations. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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Notes: All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
Data Source: Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) for the Democracy Index; World Development Indicators 
(WDI) online database of the World Bank for GDP per capita and population growth; and Nguyen-Hong and Wells 
(2003) for the foreign restrictiveness indices in higher education. 
 
Using individual components of the HDI as dependent variables, however, surprisingly did 
not yield the predicted results. For example, regressions with life expectancy, adult literacy 
rates, and gross enrolment in tertiary education as dependent variables did not give 
significant correlations with the restrictiveness index. Neither did restrictions in education 
services show a correlation with the size of the college-educated labor force. However, 
restrictions in consumption abroad (mode 2), cross-border supply (mode 1), and movement 
of natural persons (mode 4) are negatively correlated with the life satisfaction index (Table 
3).
11
Table 3: Results of Regressions Using Different Dependent Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variable  Result 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
No significance observed for any restrictiveness 
index. 
Adult Literacy 
No significance observed for any restrictiveness 
index. 
Gross Enrollment in Tertiary Education 
No significance observed for any restrictiveness 
index. 
Labor Force with Tertiary Education 
(% of Total Labor Force)  
No significance observed for any restrictiveness 
index. 
Predicted Life Satisfaction Index 
(Value Range 0-10 (High Satisfaction)) 
Foreign restrictiveness indices for consumption 
abroad, cross border supply, and movement of 
natural persons are significant at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
Gini Index 
Foreign restrictiveness index for commercial 
presence is significant at 10%, but the sign is 
negative. 
Expenditure per Student, Tertiary 
(% of gross domestic product per capita) 
Foreign restrictiveness index for consumption 
abroad and overall foreign index are significant 
at 1% and 10% respectively with positive 
coefficients. 
Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.25 a Day 
(purchasing power parity) (% of Population) 
No significance observed for any restrictiveness 
index. 
Source: Authors’ own estimates. 
 
In summary, our results show that restrictions on education services are not only associated 
with poorer human development results, but also that some restrictions on modes of supply 
have a greater impact than others. In particular, it appears that restrictions on commercial 
presence take on greater importance for human development than restrictions on other 
                                                 
11 Detailed regression results used in Table 3 are available from the authors upon request.  ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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modes of supply. But for democracy and per capita income, all modes of supply restrictions 
are significantly associated with these outcomes. The life satisfaction index is negatively 
correlated with restrictions on all modes of supply except commercial presence, while the 
Gini coefficient regression seems to suggest that restrictions in commercial presence, 
surprisingly, lessen inequality. 
3.2  Distribution Services 
There are many potential links between distribution services and human development. A 
variety of human development outcomes rely on the ability to move important goods 
efficiently and cost-effectively from one point to another. (Sarley, Allain, and Akkihal, 2005), 
for instance, analyze the cost of upgrading supply chains as part of meeting the increased 
movements of certain goods inherent in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. One 
example is agricultural staples: an effective distribution network enables poor households to 
access markets for basic produce, either as buyers or sellers. Economic and nutritional 
wellbeing are therefore both linked to the quality of distribution services. 
Vaccines are another important example. Most developing countries lack the means to 
manufacture basic vaccines locally. Even in those with domestic capacity, economies of 
scale mean that production is usually concentrated in just a few central locations. To 
maximize the human development impact of the availability of vaccines, it is of course vital 
that they be distributed to those in need. An efficient, high quality, and cost-effective 
distribution network represents a necessary intermediate link in the chain between vaccine 
producers and consumers.
12
                                                 
12 Public procurement policies are also likely to affect the vaccination outcomes we are interested in here. 
However, we do not have data with which to measure such policies in the same way as we can measure 
restrictions on trade in distribution services. 
 To the extent that regulation of the sector influences prices, 
costs, and quality of service provision, it is therefore possible that trade and regulatory 
policies in distribution directly affect human development outcomes such as vaccine 
availability. 
Non-parametric regression analysis provides some initial support for this hypothesis of a link 
between distribution sector regulation and vaccine availability. Figure 4 shows that even 
after controlling for GDP per capita, there is a noticeable negative association between the 
restrictiveness of domestic regulation in the distribution sector, and the rate of the diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccination. A very similar relationship is observed using the 




Figure 4: Non-parametric Regression of the Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus (DPT) 
Immunization Rate on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an Index of 
Distribution Services Restrictiveness. One Outlier Excluded 
   
Data source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity Commission’s 
database of restrictions to services trade for the restrictiveness indices. 
 
Figure 5: Non-parametric Regression of the Measles Immunization Rate on per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an Index of Distribution Services Restrictiveness 
One Outlier Excluded 
 
Data source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity Commission’s 
database of restrictions to services trade for the restrictiveness indices. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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Evidence from standard OLS regressions confirms these insights (Table 4).
13
                                                 
13 Results are qualitatively identical if we use a fractional logit model to take account of the fact that the 
dependent variable is bound between zero and unity (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). 
 Of course, 
results need to be interpreted cautiously in light of the simplicity of the model and the very 
small number of observations. But the first indications are that a more restrictive set of 
distribution sector regulations is associated with lower immunization rates: both regressions 
using the domestic restrictiveness index show negative and statistically significant 
coefficients. This result is robust to the inclusion of per capita GDP as a control variable. 
This last point is important because of the strong role played by income in determining 
human development outcomes such as vaccination rates. Our results show that even after 
controlling for income, more liberal distribution sector regulations are linked to stronger 
immunization outcomes. 
Interestingly, it is only the regressions using the domestic restrictiveness index that produce 
significant results (columns 1 and 3). Neither regression using the foreign restrictiveness 
index has a statistically significant coefficient (columns 2 and 4). This result suggests that it 
is the overall quality of regulation that matters for distribution sector performance, not just the 





Table 4: Regression Results Using Distribution Restrictiveness Indices 













Log (GDP per 
capita) 
6.697***  6.981***  5.096**  4.880** 




-40.677*    -59.944**   




  10.509    -10.358 
    (0.425)    (0.495) 
Constant  27.800*  19.971  42.503**  42.681* 
  (0.086)  (0.287)  (0.031)  (0.076) 
Observations  36  37  36  37 
R
2  0.46  0.42  0.32  0.22 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. Prob. values are reported in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). One outlier is excluded in each 
regression. 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank for immunization rates and GDP per 
capita; and the Australian Productivity Commission’s database of restrictions to services trade for the restrictiveness 
indices. 
For this sector, we can also adopt an alternative empirical strategy that allows us to greatly 
increase the number of observations in our sample. To do so, we use one component of the 
World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI 2007) as a measure of sectoral performance 
in place of the Australian Productivity Commission regulatory indicators. The LPI is based on 
a survey administered to around 1,000 logistics professionals around the world. By asking 
them to rate performance in a number of countries with which they trade, the overall sample 
size is increased to around 5,000 observations. The LPI itself is a composite of six indices 
based on average responses to survey questions. The component we use here asks 
respondents to rate on a one to five scale the quality and competence of logistics services in 
a given country. 
Although a valid measure of the performance of service providers in this area, the LPI data 
clearly differ from the policy restrictiveness measures used elsewhere in this paper in that 
they measure private sector development rather than public sector regulation. Nonetheless, 
using the LPI data makes it possible to greatly expand the sample, and thus to include 
additional explanatory variables that help demonstrate the robustness of our results. In 
particular, we include controls for the total spend on health in GDP—to account for the fact 
that a higher level of health spending should produce higher vaccination rates—and the ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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overall level of government effectiveness, i.e. the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. We also include an interaction term between the LPI services component and per 
capita GDP, to account for the possibility that logistics affects vaccination rates differently in 
developed versus developing countries. 
Results using OLS are in Table 5.
14
                                                 
14 Again, we obtain qualitatively identical results using the fractional logit model. 
 The signs of all control variables are as expected: 
countries at higher incomes, those that spend more on health, and those with more effective 
governments tend to have higher levels of immunization for DPT and measles. All control 
variables have coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the LPI 
services component has a positive and 1% significant coefficient: in line with the smaller 
sample results presented above, better logistics performance is associated with higher 
immunization rates. Interestingly, the interaction term is negative and 1% statistically 
significant, which indicates that the link between performance in logistics services and 
vaccination rates becomes weaker as countries get richer. This result highlights the main 
argument of this paper, namely that getting service delivery right is particularly important for 




Table 5: Regression Results Using the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 
  (1)  (2) 
 
Immunization Rate for 
diphtheria, pertussis, and 
tetanus (DPT) 
Immunization Rate (Measles) 
LPI (services)  0.475***  0.448*** 
  (0.006)  (0.004) 
LPI*Log (GDP per capita)  -0.056***  -0.054*** 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Log (GDP Per Capita)  0.171***  0.166*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Total Health Spending % GDP  1.156***  0.842* 
  (0.006)  (0.062) 
Government Effectiveness 
Index 
0.072***  0.071** 
  (0.007)  (0.014) 
Constant  -0.611  -0.546 
  (0.139)  (0.146) 
Observations  142  142 
R
2  0.355  0.305 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. Prob. values are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
Data Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) online database of the World Bank for immunization rates, GDP 
per capita, and total spending on health as a percentage of GDP; the World Governance Indicators for the index of 
government effectiveness; and the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index for the LPI services component. 
3.3  Engineering Services 
We also expect regulation in the engineering services sector to be correlated with a number 
of important human development outcomes. Engineering services are an important input in 
many development areas. Construction projects that improve the quality of life in rural areas 
are an example. So too is the extension of basic services such as telephony. To the extent 
that engineering services are available on a high-quality and cost-effective basis, these kinds 
of projects become easier and less expensive to implement. We therefore expect that a 
regulatory stance that tends to reduce cost in the sector should be associated with better 
development outcomes in these areas. 
In this case, the data provide only mixed evidence in relation to this hypothesis. Non-
parametric regressions using telecommunications outcomes as the dependent variables 
tend to support it. This is true for the number of telephone users and Internet users per 100 
population (Figures 6–7): in both cases, there is an apparent negative relationship between 
engineering sector restrictiveness and development outcomes after controlling for per capita 
income. Surprisingly, the same result does not hold for road density: there is no obvious 




Figure 6: Non-parametric Regression of the Number of Telephone Users per 100 




Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity Commission 
database of restrictions to services trade. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
 
18 
Figure 7: Non-parametric Regression of the Number of Internet Users per 100 
Population on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an Index of Engineering 
Services Restrictiveness 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity Commission 




Figure 8: Non-parametric Regression of Road Density on per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and an Index of Engineering Services Restrictiveness 
 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity Commission 
database of restrictions to services trade. 
Results from OLS regressions are similar to those from the nonparametric exercise (Table 
6). We find that after controlling for per capita income, the restrictiveness of regulation in the 
engineering sector is associated with weaker outcomes in terms of telephone users (foreign 
index, column 4) and Internet users (domestic index, column 1). The same is true for road 
network density using the foreign index (column 6). Whereas in distribution services it is only 
the domestic index that matters for performance, here we find evidence that general 
regulation and the degree of discrimination vis-à-vis foreign service providers are both 




Table 6: Regression Results Using Engineering Restrictiveness Indices 
















Road Density Road Density 
Log (GDP per 
capita ) 
15.347***  13.889***  23.644***  22.807***  0.703*  0.601** 




-47.962**    -15.535    -0.870   




  -22.015    -26.271*    -3.952* 
    (0.177)    (0.074)    (0.096) 
Constant  -121.343***  -106.656***  -185.161***  -173.644***  -5.439*  -3.864* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.044)  (0.050) 
Observations  34  34  34  34  28  28 
R
2  0.619  0.602  0.840  0.851  0.216  0.295 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. Prob. values are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank for Internet and phone users per 100 
population, road density, and GDP per capita; and the Australian Productivity Commission database of restrictions to 
services trade for the restrictiveness indices. 
3.4  Telecommunications Services 
In the information age, access to basic telecommunication services is an important part of 
civic life. It enables citizens to participate in economic, social, and political life. It enables 
them to access basic information and to communicate more easily with others. Extension of 
basic telecommunication services to the hinterland has long been an important development 
objective. Regulation has traditionally played a strong role in shaping the sector. In recent 
decades, however, there has been a strong move towards liberalization, which has been 
accompanied by a general extension of the availability of basic services. 
Indeed, the telecommunications sector provides some of the strongest evidence in favor of 
our core hypothesis that less restrictive regulation is linked to better human development 
outcomes. In terms of access to basic services, nonparametric regressions strongly suggest 
an inverse relationship between regulatory restrictiveness and access to telephony and the 
Internet (Figures 9–12). The same is true for the HDI education index and the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) voice and accountability indicator. In line with the discussion in 
the previous paragraph, these results suggest that better regulation not only increases 
access to basic services, but can also help improve a country’s general development and ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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governance environment by improving internal communication links. 
 
Figure 9: Non-parametric Regression of the Number of Internet Users per 100 
Population on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an Index of 
Telecommunication Services Restrictiveness 
 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity 
Commission’s database of restrictions to services trade. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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Figure 10: Non-parametric Regression of the Number of Telephone Users per 100 
Population on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an Index of 
Telecommunication Services Restrictiveness 
 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators database of the World Bank; Australian Productivity Commission 
database of restrictions to services trade. 
 
Figure 11: Non-parametric Regression of the Human Development Index (HDI) 
Education Index on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an Index of 
Telecommunication Services Restrictiveness 
 
 
Data Source: Human development index website; Australian Productivity Commission database of restrictions to 




Figure 12: Non-parametric Regression of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Voice and Accountability Index on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an 
Index of Telecommunication Services Restrictiveness 
 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank; World Governance Indicators; 
Australian Productivity Commission database of restrictions to services trade for the restrictiveness indices. 
Parametric OLS regressions confirm these insights (Table 7). As in Table 5 above (LPI 
regressions), the expanded sample size available with the telecommunications data makes it 
possible to include some additional control variables, namely: overall government 
effectiveness (as defined above); and total government spending as a percentage of GDP, 
as an indicator of the extent to which the state is involved in service provision. The control 
variables generally have the expected signs, but they are not always statistically significant. 
In all eight regressions, however, the indices of regulatory restrictiveness are negatively and 
1% statistically significantly associated with our various development outcome measures, i.e. 
access to the Internet and telephony, education, and voice and accountability in government. 




Table 7: Regression Results Using Telecommunications Restrictiveness Indices 
































Log (per capita 
GDP) 
0.004  0.003  0.056***  0.055***  0.120***  0.118***  -0.026  -0.029 




-0.231***    -0.220***    -0.383***    -0.918*   




  -0.126***    -0.120***    -0.187***    -0.623** 




0.093***  0.092***  0.108***  0.108***  -0.056**  -0.051*  0.729***  0.702*** 




-0.038  -0.037  0.105  0.107  0.278  0.252  -0.066  0.021 
  (0.747)  (0.749)  (0.504)  (0.500)  (0.326)  (0.387)  (0.952)  (0.985) 
Constant  0.123**  0.131**  -0.228**  -0.222**  -0.153  -0.151  0.447  0.529 
  (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.375)  (0.382)  (0.464)  (0.375) 
Observations  132  132  133  133  113  113  133  133 
R
2  0.768  0.768  0.838  0.838  0.595  0.587  0.670  0.676 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. Prob. values are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank for Internet and phone users per 100 
population, GDP per capita, and total government spending as a percentage of GDP; the human development index 
website for the education index; the World Governance Indicators for the voice and accountability and government 
effectiveness indices; and the Australian Productivity Commission’s database of restrictions to services trade for the 
restrictiveness indices. 
3.5  Pooled Estimation Results 
The most obvious shortcoming of the above sectoral results is that they only control for per 
capita income. There are many other factors that could also potentially influence human 
development outcomes, in addition to income and sector-level regulation. Examples include 
the general level of development of governance institutions, and the overall efficiency of 
regulation. However, small sample sizes make it impractical to account directly for these 
influences through the inclusion of additional control variables. 
To try and deal with this problem, we also estimate models that pool data across all sectors. ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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This approach allows us to include fixed effects by country and by sector. The fixed effects 
clean out all external influences that vary in the country or sector dimensions, thereby 
relieving to a large extent the omitted variable bias that might be suspected in our previous 
results. For instance, the fixed effects control for influences such as government 
effectiveness, or the composition of government spending. In terms of the data, we proceed 
by selecting one human development indicator per sector: the DPT immunization rate for 
distribution; Internet users per 100 population for engineering; and phone users per 100 
population for telecoms. At this stage, we do not include education in the panel estimates 
because of the different structure of the regulatory indicators, which measure restrictiveness 
by mode of supply rather than on an aggregate domestic or foreign basis, as in the other 
sectors. 
The first two columns of Table 8 present estimation results for the pooled model using data 
for all three sectors. Results strongly support our contention: the domestic and foreign 
restrictiveness indices both have negative and statistically significant coefficients (1% and 
5% respectively). The difference in magnitude between the two coefficients suggests, as 
noted above, that it is usually the restrictiveness of domestic regulation that makes most 
difference in terms of human development outcomes. 
In the last two columns of Table 8, we exclude the telecom sector from our dataset. The 
reason for doing so is that it strongly dominates the other sectors in terms of the number of 
data points available. Although the domestic and foreign restrictiveness indices both have 
the expected negative coefficients, they are no longer statistically significant once we 
exclude the telecom sector. Our results in columns 1–2 are therefore  being driven to a 
significant degree by a close link between regulation and human development outcomes in 
that sector. In part, this is a consequence of data limitations: our human development data 
are much more closely related to sectoral economic performance in telecom than in the 
other sectors. The greatly reduced sample size is also a constraint: our regressions in 
columns 3–4 have only 71 observations but a total of 39 dummy variables to account for 
country- and sector-level influences. The last two regressions are therefore pushing the data 




Table 8: Regression Results Using Pooled Data 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








-48.676***    -15.732   




  -26.702**    -4.951 
    (0.007)    (0.816) 
Observations  207  207  71  71 
R
2  0.968  0.967  0.959  0.959 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. Prob. values are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
Data Source: World Development Indicators online database of the World Bank for phone users per 100 population, 
Internet users per 100 population, and the rate of diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus immunization; and the Australian 
Productivity Commission database of restrictions to services trade for the restrictiveness indices. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented some first empirical evidence on the links between services trade 
and human development. The data generally show that a more restrictive services trade 
policy environment is correlated with worse human development outcomes. This finding is 
consistent with a mechanism in which more restrictive services policies result in higher 
prices of basic goods and services for consumers. It has long been argued that trade policy 
in services sectors can lead to higher national income, which in turn can promote human 
development. Our results go one step further in isolating a direct connection between service 
sector restrictiveness and development, which acts independently of the income channel. 
One implication of our results is that the tension between service sector openness and 
human development outcomes,  which is apparent in some of the development policy 
literature, has perhaps been overstated. At the very least, our results suggest that there is no 
systematic association between greater policy restrictiveness and better outcomes. Rather, 
open and efficient services sectors can help promote human development. Reducing the 
restrictiveness of service sector policies through well-designed liberalization programs can 
be one element of a successful approach to promoting economic and human development 
together. 
There is considerable room for future research to expand on our approach and results. The 
main difficulty we have confronted relates to the availability of data on applied policy settings 
in services sectors. As data for more countries and years become available, it will be 
possible to expand the sample size used here, and perhaps even move to a genuine panel ADBI Working Paper 268    Shepherd and Pasadilla 
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data framework. Both steps are important in ensuring that our results are robust to the 
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APPENDIX: TRADE IN HEALTH SERVICES AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
Liberalizing trade in health services has both potential negative and positive results. For 
example, by liberalizing cross-border trade, telemedicine can help in upgrading knowledge of 
local medical professionals, and make available expert medical advice even in remote areas. 
Increased foreign investment in hospitals and clinic facilities can improve supply of medical 
services, both in terms of quality and quantity. Greater access to state-of-the art medical 
technology becomes possible. Improving facilities can help attract more foreign health 
consumers who are shopping around for cheaper services for simple medical procedures 
and can help increase foreign exchange receipts from medical tourists. 
However, these positive outcomes have to be balanced with the potential downside. For 
example, in telemedicine, how does one control for potential medical malpractice? Who is 
supposed to shoulder the liabilities? Increased foreign-funded hospital facilities can generate 
an internal brain drain effect, whereby medical professionals move from the public hospitals 
or clinics to higher-paying private facilities. Liberalization’s effect on quality medical access 
for the broader population is a serious offset to the potential benefits from greater access to 
advanced medical services that those in middle-  to high-income groups enjoy. Freer 
movements of medical professionals could also lead to a brain drain situation, at the 
expense of huge public subsidy for educating them. 
Because data in health services is difficult to obtain, it is hard to make correlations between 
liberalization of health services and development outcomes, particularly with regards to 
equity and access to medical services. On the one hand, there are not many instances of 
liberalization in health services, if we go by the number of General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) commitments in the sectoronly about 32 out of 134 members have made 
commitments in health services. On the other, some of the potential negative effects have 
taken place with or without liberalization: for example, the outward migration of medical 
professionals, which has been observed in developing countries regardless of liberalization 
or GATS commitments in developed economies. Likewise, the increase in cross-border 
trade in medical transcription services has taken place without mode 1 commitments in 
many outsourcing destination countries. 
As with other service sectors, it is expedient for governments to fix their national regulatory 
framework and understand national policies and priorities before opening up an important 
sector like health services, where many public services and subsidies may be affected, and 
in which the objective for policy goes far beyond mere economics. For many countries, their 
first priority is wide, high-quality health care coverage at an affordable cost. Equity and 
access considerations are important considerations that should be balanced out against the 
potential increase in foreign exchange receipts through health services exports. 